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COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL ON TRIAL

Grant H. Morris,* Ansar M. Haroun, M.D.,** David Naimark, M.D. ***

“[S]uperfluity comes sooner by white hairs, but competency lives longer.”1

I. Introduction: The Theory and Reality of Competency Adjudication
In theory, the requirement that a criminal defendant be mentally competent before
the trial can proceed assures that the defendant will receive a fair trial. Indeed, the Supreme

*

©Grant H. Morris 2004. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of
Law; Clinical Professor, Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of
California, San Diego. The authors acknowledge, with great appreciation, the University of
San Diego for the financial support it provided to this project. The authors also
acknowledge, with great appreciation, Professor Cameron Parker, Department of
Mathematics and Computer Science, University of San Diego for the statistical analysis he
provided of our data.
**

Supervising Psychiatrist, San Diego County Forensic Psychiatry Clinic; Associate
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Program in Law, Logic and Ethics in Medicine,
University of California, San Diego; Adjunct Professor, University of San Diego School of
Law.
***

Forensic Psychiatrist, San Diego County Forensic Psychiatry Clinic; Adjunct
Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 2, lines 8-9 (Charles H.
Shattuck ed., The Univ. Press of Virginia 1974) (1600).
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Court has ruled that the prohibition against conducting a criminal trial of an
incompetent defendant “is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.”2 In reality,
however, an adjudication that the defendant is incompetent deprives the defendant of any
trial–assuring that he or she will remain in limbo as “accused” until he or she has been
restored to competency. For some defendants, especially mentally retarded defendants and
others whose incapacity is permanent, that day will never come.3

2

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).

3

See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), invalidating a statute permitting
indeterminate, and potentially life-time, commitment of a mentally retarded, deaf mute
person who had been found incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 717-19, 738. Equal
protection is denied when incompetent criminal defendants are subjected to a more lenient
commitment standard (i.e., incompetence to stand criminal trial) and to a more stringent
release standard (i.e., restoration of trial competence) than is applicable to all other
persons who are not charged with crimes and who could only be detained under the state’s
civil commitment laws. See id. at 730. Although the finding of incompetence to stand trial
may justify a brief period of detention designed to restore the defendant’s competence, due
process requires that incompetent defendants who cannot soon be restored to competency
must be released or subjected to “the customary civil commitment proceeding that would
be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen.” Id. at 738. Although the Court
declined to specify when civil commitment or release must occur, the Court noted that
detention of incompetent defendants is appropriate only for those defendants who
“probably soon will be able to stand trial.” Id. And even for those defendants, the Court
required that commitment “must be justified by progress toward that goal.” Id.
Nevertheless, a review of legislation in the fifty states and the District of Columbia,
conducted twenty years after the Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Indiana, revealed that
the decision has been ignored or circumvented in a majority of jurisdictions. Grant H.
Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 13-33 (1993).
Some states ignore Jackson by continuing to allow incompetent defendants to be detained
until their competence has been restored. Id. at 13. Others evade Jackson by imposing a
lengthy period of treatment before acknowledging that the defendant is permanently
incompetent, i.e., that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will become
competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future. See id. at 15-18. Several states tie the
maximum length of the treatment period to the maximum sentence that could have been
-2-
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In theory, a mentally incompetent defendant has not been convicted for the crime of
which he or she has been accused and is presumed to be innocent of that crime.4 In reality,
however, unlike other presumed innocent defendants who are released on bail until they
stand trial, incompetent criminal defendants are routinely confined in maximum security
wards of state mental hospitals until they become competent.5 Unlike others in our society

imposed if the defendant had been convicted of the crime charged. Id. at 17-18. In
California, permanently incompetent criminal defendants can be placed on mental health
conservatorships using different criteria than are used to establish mental health
conservatorships for all other mentally ill people. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5350,
5008(h)(1)(A)-(B) (West 1998). Additionally, by law, other conservatees must be placed
in the least restrictive placement. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1)(A).
Permanently incompetent criminal defendant conservatees, however, must be placed in a
facility “that achieves the purposes of treatment of the conservatee and protection of the
public.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1)(B).
4

Because the incompetent defendant has not been tried for the crime charged against
him or her, the defendant retains the status of any accused, but not convicted, criminal
defendant. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until they are convicted. As Justice
Stevens noted: “Prior to conviction every individual is entitled to the benefit of a
presumption . . . that he is innocent of prior criminal conduct . . . .” Bell v . Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 582 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976) (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a
basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).
5

For example, on July 2, 2003, there were 156 mentally incompetent criminal
defendants confined in Atascadero State Hospital, California’s maximum security mental
hospital, of a total patient population of 1190. By comparison, only seventy-three patients
in that facility were persons acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity. Most of the other
patients were either mentally ill, sentence-serving convicts or sexually violent predators.
E-mail from Barrie Hafler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero State Hospital, to Grant
Morris, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law (July 9, 2003, 11:52:01
PST) (on file with Professor Morris).
-3-
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whose involuntary detention is permitted only if their mental condition meets civil
commitment standards of dangerousness6 or inability to provide for their basic needs,7

6

The state exercises its police power to civilly commit mentally ill individuals who
pose a danger to themselves or others. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West
1998) (requiring that to be subjected to a 180-day renewable civil commitment hold in
California, the individual must have attempted, inflicted, or made a serious threat of
substantial physical harm upon another person that either resulted in the individual’s
confinement on a short-term evaluation or treatment hold or that occurred during that hold,
and must continue to present a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm
upon others); MONT . CODE. ANN. § 53-21-126 (1)(b)-(c), (2) (2003) (mandating that the
court, in determining whether civil commitment is appropriate, shall consider whether the
person “has recently, because of a mental disorder and through an act or an omission,
caused self-injury or injury to others” and “whether, because of a mental disorder, there is
an imminent threat of injury to the [person] or to others because of the [person’s] acts or
omissions” and providing that an “[i]mminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury to
others must be proved by overt acts or omissions, sufficiently recent in time as to be
material and relevant as to the [person’s] present condition”); Nebraska Mental Health
Commitment Act, 2004 Neb. Laws Legis. Bill 1083, §§ 28, 45, amending NEB. REV. STAT .
§§ 83-1009(2), -1037 (1999) (WESTLAW through 98th Neb. Legis. 2d Sess.) (defining a
mentally ill person as a dangerous person and subject to civil commitment if he or she
presents a “substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons within the near
future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by placing
others in reasonable fear of such harm” or presents a “substantial risk of serious harm to
himself or herself within the near future as manifested by evidence of recent attempts at, or
threats of suicide or serious bodily harm”); PA. STAT . ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7301(a), (b)(1),
7304, 7305 (West 2001) (providing that severely mentally disabled persons are subject to
civil commitment and defining a severely mentally disabled person as posing “a clear and
present danger of harm to others or to himself” as “shown by establishing that within the
past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another
and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated”); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that to justify civil
commitment, the state must prove “that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is
not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others” and that this proof of
dangerousness must be based “upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do
substantial harm to oneself or another”). See generally 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§2A-4.1 to 4.6 (2d ed. 1998) .
7

The state exercises its parens patriae power to civilly commit mentally ill
individuals who are unable to provide for their basic necessities or who lack decision
-4-
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incompetent criminal defendants are detained simply because they have been adjudicated
incompetent to stand trial. Even though civilly committed patients have a right to refuse
psychotropic medication unless they lack the capacity to understand the risks and benefits
of the medication they refuse,8 incompetent criminal defendants may be forcibly medicated

making capacity. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5008 (h)(1)(A), 5350,
5358(a)(1)-(2) (West 1998) (defining “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person
as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for
food, clothing, or shelter,” establishing a mental health conservatorship for a gravely
disabled person, and authorizing the conservator to subject the conservatee to inpatient
commitment); MONT . CODE ANN. § 53-21-126 (1)(a) (2003)(authorizing civil
commitment of a person, who, “because of a mental disorder, is substantially unable to
provide for [his or her] own basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety”);
Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act, 2004 Neb. Laws Legis. Bill 1083, §§ 28, 45,
amending NEB. REV. STAT . §§ 83-1009(2), -1037 (1999) (WESTLAW through 98th Neb.
Legis. 2d Sess.) (defining a mentally ill person as a dangerous person and subject to civil
commitment if he or she presents “[a] substantial risk of serious harm to himself or herself
within the near future as manifested by . . . evidence of inability to provide for his or her
basic human needs, including food, clothing, shelter, essential medical care, or personal
safety”); PA. STAT . ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7301(a), (b)(2), 7304, 7305 (West 2001) (providing
that severely mentally disabled persons are subject to civil commitment and defining a
severely mentally disabled person as posing “a clear and present danger of harm to others
or to himself” as proven “by establishing that within the past 30 days . . . the person has
acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision and
the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical
care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that
death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days
unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act”). See generally PERLIN, supra
note 6, at §§ 2A-4.6 to 4.7.
8

Courts in many states have held that civilly committed mental patients have a right
to refuse psychotropic medication in the absence of an adjudication that they are
incompetent to make treatment decisions. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in nonemergency
situations, antipsychotic medication cannot be administered to involuntarily committed
civil patients without their consent absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to
make treatment decisions); Rogers v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983)
(holding that involuntarily committed civil patients do not lose the right to make treatment
-5-
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to restore their trial competence even if they have that capacity. 9 For this reason, criminal
defendants are sometimes referred for competence assessments so that treatment may be
forced upon them even though they are not civilly committable.10 Especially when the
statutory criteria for civil commitment is perceived as too restrictive to permit easy use, an
arrest on a minor offense and a spurious request for a competency evaluation can achieve
diversion from the criminal process and easy access to coerced treatment.11

decisions unless they are adjudicated incompetent by a judge in incompetency
proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342-344 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that
involuntary civil commitment, without more, does not establish that the committed person
lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of medication refusal decisions
and that a judicial determination that the patient lacks that capacity is required before the
state may administer antipsychotic drugs over the patient’s objection). Utilizing the
informed consent doctrine, “virtually every court that has considered the matter now
recognizes a ‘right to refuse’ psychotropic medication for institutionalized populations.”
RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 923 (4th ed. 2004).
9

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177-83 (2003). In Sell, the Supreme Court
ruled that the government’s interest in restoring a defendant’s competence to stand trial so
that he or she can stand trial on a serious criminal charge overrides the defendant’s interest
in avoiding the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication “if the treatment is
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the
fairness of the trial, and taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary
significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.” Id. at 179. The
Court noted, however, that under this standard, involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medications solely to restore trial competence “may be rare.” Id. at 180.
10

See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS
128 (1997) (asserting that “incompetency referrals are used as a ruse to force treatment of
persons who do not meet dangerousness requirements for civil commitment and who may
be acting bizarrely”).
11

See Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful
Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 78 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)
(asserting that the competency inquiry functions as a surrogate for civil commitment for
-6-
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Robert Burt and Norval Morris once observed that although “trial of an incompetent
defendant may, indeed, be unfair . . . [w]ithholding trial often results in an endless
prolongation of the incompetent defendant’s accused status, and his virtually automatic
civil commitment.”12 They characterized this delay of trial and coerced treatment as “a
cruelly ironic way” to assure that incompetent defendants are treated fairly.13 They
proposed instead that the trial of an incompetent defendant should proceed but that special
pretrial and trial procedures should be employed to redress the defendant’s incapacity, e.g.,
require complete pretrial disclosure by the prosecution, impose a higher burden than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, require that a corroborating witness establish elements of the
offense, instruct the jury to consider the disability of the defendant.14 As an alternative,

mentally disordered defendants who the prosecutor or judge believes should be treated in
the mental health system); ARTHUR R. MATTHEWS, JR., AM. BAR FOUND., MENTAL
DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 72, 77 (1970) (suggesting that the competency
inquiry often initiates a search for a negotiated dispositional alternative to a criminal trial
for mentally disordered defendants, especially if they are charged only with minor crimes).
See also GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTS: COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 885-86 (1974) (noting that in the year
following California’s enactment of a restrictive civil commitment law, the number of
criminal defendants committed to Metropolitan State Hospital as incompetent to stand trial
rose from 20 to 600); Robert D. Miller, Hospitalization of Criminal Defendants for
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial or for Restoration of Competence: Clinical
and Legal Issues, 21 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 369, 370-71 (2003) (discussing studies
documenting an increase in competency to stand trial commitments for nondangerous
defendants in response to restrictions placed on civil commitment).
12

Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the
Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66, 75 (1972).
13

Id.

14

Id. at 76, 94-95.
-7-
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Bruce Winick proposed that defendants who object to the incompetency adjudication
should, with the concurrence of defense counsel, be able to waive the incompetency status
and proceed to trial. 15
These proposals have not succeeded16 and are not likely to succeed. The Supreme
Court has specifically declared: “A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is
competent.”17 The Court has also held that “it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may
be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court
determine his capacity to stand trial.”18 These pronouncements virtually assure that the

15

Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A
Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
571, 573, 582-96 (1995); Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32
UCLA L. REV. 921, 927-28, 951-79 (1985) [hereinafter Restructuring]. But see Richard
J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 539, 542-48 (1993) (critiquing Restructuring, endorsing a prohibition
against trial of an incompetent defendant, and proposing an enhanced role for counsel and a
minimization of formal judicial intervention to determine competence).
16

See Bonnie, supra note 15, at 542 (asserting that “the Burt and Morris approach
has found little favor in the courts because their proposal is wholly incompatible with
settled law . . . . In the face of such a deeply rooted doctrine, the abolitionist proposal is, to
put it mildly, somewhat quixotic.”).
17

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). In Godinez, the Court cited Pate v.
Robinson for this proposition. Id. However, in Pate, the state simply conceded that due
process is violated if an accused is convicted while legally incompetent. Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of whether
trial of an incompetent defendant is permissible if the defendant is acquitted of the crime in
that proceeding. Nevertheless, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975), the
Court noted that the prohibition against trying a mentally incompetent defendant “is
fundamental to an adversary system of justice.”
18

Pate, 383 U.S. at 384.
-8-

Published by Digital USD, 2004

9

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 19 [2004]

competency adjudication process will not be abolished or radically restructured.
One would anticipate that the severe consequences of an incompetency
adjudication19 would lead lawyers to fiercely dispute the issue whenever it is raised in
court. Such a contest, however, rarely occurs.20 Competence to stand trial is not viewed as
an adversarial issue. In fact, to assure that the defendant is not deprived of the due process
right to a fair trial,21 the prosecutor, and the defense attorney, 22 as well as the trial judge,23

19

See Restructuring, supra note 15, at 928-51(discussing in detail the staggering
costs of conducting competency evaluations and treating those found incompetent and the
burdens that the process places on defendants subjected to that process).
20

An American Bar Foundation study of competency hearings revealed that most
hearings were completed quickly and often perfunctorily. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at
122. See also HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP? 45-47 (1979) (reporting that 64%
of competency hearings studied were not contested by either the district attorney or the
defense counsel and that most of those hearings “were two- or three-minute rubber
stampings of the psychiatric reports”). Id. at 47.
21

U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(providing for various trial rights in all criminal prosecutions, including the assistance of
defense counsel).
22

The American Bar Association, in its Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards,
approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1984, adopted a standard requiring the
prosecutor and the defense counsel to move for the evaluation of the defendant’s
competence whenever the prosecutor or the defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to
the defendant’s competence. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
standard 7-4.2 (b), (c) (1989). See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(a) (2000) (authorizing the
defense attorney or the government attorney to file a motion for a hearing to determine the
defendant’s mental competence to stand trial and requiring the court to grant the motion, or
to order a hearing on its own motion, if reasonable cause exists to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial).
23

In Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, the Supreme Court held: “Where the evidence raises a
‘bone fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own
-9-
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all have an obligation to raise the issue whenever reasonable cause exists to believe that the
accused is incompetent.
Once the issue is raised, defense counsel, who the Supreme Court acknowledges
“will often have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his
defense,”24 typically does not testify in the incompetency hearing. The attorney may be
concerned that his or her testimony may violate an ethical responsibility not to disclose
confidential communications or any communication protected by the attorney-client
privilege.25 The attorney may be concerned that his or her testimony on the defendant’s
competency may jeopardize the attorney-client relationship, especially if the attorney
believes the defendant is incompetent and the defendant believes to the contrary. 26 Even if
defense counsel testifies, his or her testimony is far more likely to be discounted as selfinterested or biased than is the testimony of a forensic evaluator who conducted an

motion must impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing . . . .”
24

Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992).

25

See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-4.8
Commentary at 212-13 (1989). See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing
ABA Standard 7-4.8(b)(ii), which protects the testifying attorney from disclosing such
communications).
26

See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-4.8
Commentary at 213 (1989) (discussing the “strain” placed on the attorney-client
relationship by the defense attorney’s testimony). See infra text following note 196
(suggesting the appropriate solution for the irreparably strained attorney-client
relationship).
-10-
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impartial examination of the defendant.27
Indeed, trial judges appear to have little interest in carefully weighing all the
evidence, and in making their own independent assessment of the defendant’s competence.
Rather, they simply prefer to adopt as their own the conclusion reached by the psychiatrist
or psychologist who evaluated the defendant.28 As Justice Blackmun observed, “[A]
competency determination is primarily a medical and psychiatric determination.
Competency determinations by and large turn on the testimony of psychiatric experts, not
lawyers.”29 One recent study reported that courts agreed with the forensic evaluator’s
judgment in 327 out of the 328 cases studied–a 99.7% rate of agreement.30 When judges in
that study were interviewed regarding this phenomenon, they asserted: “[M]ental health

27

Medina, 505 U.S. at 466 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

28

See Steven D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, Predicting Fitness To Stand Trial: The
Relative Power of Demographic, Criminal and Clinical Variables, 5 FORENSIC REP. 53,
56, 59 (1992) (reporting that the court agreed with the forensic evaluator’s finding in 77
of 80 cases studied–a rate of agreement of 96.3%). See also RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN
L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 54-55 (1980) (discussing studies reporting
that judges concur in the evaluator’s conclusions approximately 90% of the time). Roesch
and Golding concluded that “judges rarely base their decisions on anything but the
concluding statement in the psychiatric report to the court.” Id. at 17. They also found that
a majority of judges, in the North Carolina sample they studied, did not even conduct a
formal hearing to independently assess the defendant’s competence. Id. at 198. An
American Bar Foundation study revealed that “some courts have more or less consciously
delegated their decision-making authority on the competency question to the doctors who
perform the psychiatric examination.” MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 123.
29

Medina, 505 U.S. at 465 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

30

Patricia A. Zapf et al., Have the Courts Abdicated Their Responsibility for
Determination of Competency to Stand Trial to Clinicians? 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAC.
(in press 2004) (manuscript at 11, on file with Professor Morris).
-11-
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professionals are more qualified (through their specific training) to answer the question of
competency than are judges or other legal professionals.”31 One judge, expressing
frustration with forensic evaluators who do not testify to the ultimate legal issue, stated that
“his job would be ‘much easier’ if the mental health professional would ‘simply state
whether the defendant is competent or not.’”32
It is against this background that this Article considers the legal standards for the
determination of competency to stand trial, and whether those standards are understood and
applied by psychiatrists and psychologists in the forensic evaluations they perform and in
the judgments they make–judgments that are routinely accepted by trial courts as their own
judgments. Part II traces the historical development of the competency construct. Part III
reports on a survey of forensic psychiatrists and psychologists who were asked to read two
case study vignettes and assess the competency of each criminal defendant using three
differently-worded competency standards. The objective was to determine whether
forensic evaluators would distinguish between the standards (i.e., find the defendant
competent under one standard but not under another) or whether they would find the
defendant competent under all three standards or incompetent under all three standards.
Relying on the results of that survey, Part IV makes specific recommendations to improve
the competency assessment process. Fairness to the defendant cannot be achieved unless
the competency standard is clearly defined and applied by those who assess and determine

31

Id. at

(manuscript at 12).

32

Id.
-12-

Published by Digital USD, 2004

13

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 19 [2004]

competency.

II. The Competency Standard–From Dawn to Dusky33
Historically, the requirement that the defendant be competent to stand trial in order
for the criminal trial to proceed had both ritualistic and protective origins.34 Medievil
English law required the defendant to enter a plea before the criminal trial could proceed.35
If the defendant remained mute, increasingly heavy weights were placed on the defendant to
induce a plea so that the trial could continue.36 But defendants who were mute because of
mental disorder or physical infirmity (i.e., mute by visitation of God) instead of by choice
(i.e., mute of malice) were spared this ritual.37 The competency requirement also evolved
from the prohibition against trials in absentia.38 Just as a defendant who is not physically
present cannot defend himself or herself, so too, a mentally incompetent defendant is
unable to defend himself or herself, even if the defendant is physically present in the

33

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).

34

GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 11, at 887.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

See id.

38

Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960).
-13-
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courtroom. 39 Delaying the trial until the defendant is both physically and mentally present
protects the defendant from an adjudication of guilt that may not be warranted and that
could have been avoided if the defendant were present to defend himself or herself.
Today, the competency requirement continues to be supported for both ritualistic
and protective reasons. Mute criminal defendants are no longer tortured to force them to
plead. The court merely enters a not guilty plea, and the trial proceeds. Nevertheless, trial
is delayed for mentally incompetent defendants for two ritualistic reasons. The
requirement of competence helps to assure that the trial will be conducted in a dignified
manner. An incompetent defendant’s inappropriate behavior disturbs, if not destroys, the
trial process. The need to maintain proper courtroom decorum is not the only concern. If
the defendant is not a rational participant, the very character of the trial process as a
reasoned interaction between the state and the defendant is converted into a communal
attack against a defenseless being. 40 The requirement of competence also serves to justify
the imposition of punishment if the defendant is convicted. A retributive sanction is
justifiably imposed only if the defendant is capable of understanding why society views his
or her conduct as morally reprehensible and appropriate for punishment.41
Despite these ritualistic justifications, the protective functions of the competency
adjudication are more frequently cited to vindicate the doctrine’s continued existence. The

39

Id.

40

See Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 458 (1967).

41

See id.
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requirement of competence safeguards the accuracy of the adjudication. 42 An incompetent
defendant may not be able to appreciate what evidence is relevant to establish a defense, or
confer intelligently with counsel, or assess the evidence presented by the prosecution, or
testify coherently at trial.43 Accuracy, however, is not the only protective value. Society’s
promise of a fair trial demands that a defendant subjected to criminal trial be competent.44
The defendant, not defense counsel, has the ultimate responsibility for various criminal
process decisions, including whether: to plead innocent or guilty, to waive a jury trial, to
testify at trial, and to raise particular defenses.45 Those decisions can only be made by a
competent defendant. As Blackstone asked, rhetorically, in 1769, “And if, after he has
pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his
defence?”46

42

Id. at 457. The authors declare that “the primary purpose of the incompetency rule
is to safeguard the accuracy of adjudication.” Id.
43

See id.

44

See id. at 457-58. In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975), the
Supreme Court noted that the prohibition against trying a mentally incompetent defendant
“is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.” The Court cited Youtsey v. United
States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) as authority to support its position. In Youtsey, the court
stated: “It is not ‘due process of law’ to subject an insane person to trial upon an indictment
involving liberty or life.” Id. at 941.
45

Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 75-76. See also Bonnie, supra note 15, at
568-70 (asserting that the defendant must personally waive several constitutional
protections, must define the basic objectives of representation, and must select the main
theory of defense).
46

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. In 1790, in proceedings against
the defendant for high treason in the Old Bailey, the court applied Blackstone’s command,
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In 1835, the District of Columbia Circuit Court, in a trial of a defendant for
attempting to assassinate President Andrew Jackson, quoted approvingly from Sir Matthew
Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown, written one hundred years earlier, in which Hale
wrote that if “it appear to the court upon his trial, that he is mad, the judge in discretion may
discharge the jury of him, and remit him to gaol to be tried after the recovery of his
understanding .”47 The case is one of the first American cases to suggest that the loss of
understanding caused by mental disorder, and not mental disorder in and of itself, warrants
the adjudication of incompetency.
Just eleven years later, a New York court specifically tied the finding of
incompetency to the defendant’s inability to make a rational defense.48 In construing the
state’s competency statute which prohibited trial of insane persons, the court held that

informing the English jury:
[C]ommon humanity . . . would suggest . . . that no man shall be called upon to
make his defence at a time when his mind is in that situation as not to appear
capable of so doing; for, however guilty he may be, the inquiry into his guilt
must be postponed to that season, when by collecting together his intellects,
and having them entire, he shall be able so to model his defence as to ward
off the punishment of the law . . . .
Frith’s Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 318 (1790).
47

United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1835) (No. 15,577)
(quoting MATTHEW HALE, I THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (HISTORIA
PLACITORUM CORONAE) 35 (1736)).
48

Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1847). The court noted that
distinguished writers on criminal jurisprudence agreed that a mentally incompetent
defendant should not be tried because “[a] madman cannot make a rational defense . . . .” Id
at 20.
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sanity for purposes of competency to stand trial (i.e., the standard of present sanity), is not
measured by whether the defendant knows right from wrong (i.e., the standard of sanity at
the time of the criminal act).49 Rather, if the defendant “is capable of understanding the
nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if he rightly comprehends his
own condition in reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defense in a rational
manner he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane . . . .”50
The Freeman case may be the first to articulate the two factors that have developed
as the common law standard for competency to stand trial–an ability to understand the
nature of the proceedings against the defendant and an ability to assist in the defense. As
phrased by the Freeman court, the first factor focuses on the defendant’s thinking, i.e., the
defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings.51 The second factor focuses on the
defendant’s behavior, i.e., the defendant’s ability to make his or her defense, or to assist
counsel in making that defense “in a rational manner.”52

49

Id. at 24-25, 27-28.

50

Id. The court noted that although a “madman”–i.e., a person in a general state of
insanity whose mental powers were wholly perverted or obliterated–would, necessarily, be
incapable of making a rational defense, id. at 20, 27, nevertheless, a defendant in a partial
state of insanity–i.e., a person whose mental illness is confined to some subject other than
the alleged crime and the ensuing trial– “may be fully competent to understand his situation
in respect to the alleged offense, and to conduct his defense with discretion and reason.”
Id. at 27.
51

Id. at 24-25.

52

Id. at 25.
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Freeman is of more than historical interest.53 In 1900, more than fifty years after
Freeman was decided, the California Supreme Court quoted Freeman’s two-part standard
and asserted: “If this is the true construction of the New York statute, as I have no doubt it
is, it is equally the true construction of our own . . . .”54 Seventy-four years later, the
California legislature amended its competency statute to incorporate Freeman’s standard,
declaring: “A defendant is mentally incompetent [to stand trial] if, as a result of mental
disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the
criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational
manner.”55
Today, eight states, including such populous states as California, Illinois, Michigan,
and North Carolina, use a standard of competency that includes a requirement that the
defendant be able to either assist in or to conduct his or her defense in a “rational
manner.”56 According to the 2000 census, the eight states that employ the “rational

53

For example, in 1874, the Texas Supreme Court, citing Freeman, stated that the
competency question is whether “the accused [is] mentally competent to make a rational
defense.” Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626, 630 (1874). In Youtsey v. United States, 97 F.
937 (6th Cir. 1899), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, citing
Guagando, stated that “the issue to be tried . . . is whether the accused can make a rational
defense.” Id. at 943.
54

In re Buchanan, 61 P. 1120, 1121 (Cal. 1900).

55

Act of Sept. 26, 1974, ch. 1511, § 2, 1974 Cal. Stat. 3316 (codified as amended at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a) (West 2000)).
56

The eight states we have identified as “rational manner” states are: California,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
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manner” standard have a total population of seventy-one million people (25.3% of the
population of the United States).57 Of the eight, California,58 Michigan,59 North Carolina,60
and Wyoming61 specifically mention the “rational manner” language in their statutes, and
South Dakota62 includes the “rational manner” language in a form for an order of a
psychiatric examination appended to a statute. In Illinois63 and Louisiana,64 general
statutory language requiring the defendant to be able to assist in his or her defense has been
construed by those states’ supreme courts to mean assist in a rational manner, and in Maine,
general statutory language prohibiting trial of an incompetent defendant has been construed
by the Maine Supreme Court to require a capacity to assist in a rational manner.65

57

According to the 2000 census, the population of the United States is 281,421,906.
The population of states using the “rational manner” standard is 71,271,223. U.S. census
taken April 1, 2000 available at http://www.census.gov/Proess-Release/www/2003/SF4
(last visited on Sept. 3, 2003).
58

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a) (West 2000).

59

MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 330.2020(1) (West 1999).

60

N.C. GEN. STAT . § 15A-1001(a) (2003).

61

WYO. STAT . ANN. § 7-11-302(a)(iii) (Michie 2003).

62

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23a-46-13 (Form 13) (Michie 1998).

63

People v. Foley, 192 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ill. 1963); Withers v. People, 177 N.E.2d
203, 206 (Ill. 1961).
64

State v. Morris, 340 So. 2d 195, 203 (La. 1976); State v. Veal, 326 So. 2d 329,
331 (La. 1976); State v. Flores, 315 So. 2d 772, 773 (La. 1975); State v. Bastida, 310 So.
2d 629, 632 (La. 1975).
65

State v. Bowman, 681 A.2d 469, 471 (Me. 1996); State v. Lewis, 584 A.2d 622,
624 (Me. 1990).
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In most states today, the statutory standard for incompetence to stand trial simply
requires mental disorder (or disability or disease or defect) that incapacitates the defendant
from understanding the proceedings (or the nature of the proceedings) and from assisting in
his or her defense (or assisting or cooperating with counsel in his or her defense).66 The
“in a rational manner” flourish has not been included in the statutes and has not been
construed to be included by the appellate courts of most states. Similarly, the federal
statute merely provides that a criminal defendant is incompetent if “he is presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him . . . unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”67
Congress has not further defined the meaning of “properly.”
In 1960, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal competency statute. In Dusky v.

66

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT . ANN. § 16-8-102(3) (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT .
ANN. § 54-56d(a) (West Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-1(b) (Michie Supp.
2003); MO. ANN. STAT . § 552.020(1) (West 2002); N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2C: 4-5(b) (West
Supp. 2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.10(1) (McKinney 1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.37(G) (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(A) (Michie Supp. 2003);
WIS. STAT . ANN. § 971.13(1) (West Supp. 2003). These statutes are derived from, and
largely restate, the common law standard. See, e.g., United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284,
287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) (instructing the jury that the question to be determined is
“whether at this time the prisoner is in such possession of his mental faculties as enables
him to rightly comprehend his condition with reference to the proceedings against him, and
to rationally aid in the conduct of his defense”); Webber v. Commonwealth, 13 A. 427, 431
(Pa. 1888) (stating that “[t]he principal point to be considered by the jury would be whether
the defendant was of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the proceedings on
the trial so as to be able to make a proper defense”).
67

18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(d) (West 2000).
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United States,68 the Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that a defendant’s competency is
measured by “‘whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding–and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’”69 Unlike the language of the “rational
manner” standard, which can be interpreted to focus on both the defendant’s thinking and
his or her behavior,70 the Dusky standard’s use of “rational understanding” to measure both
the defendant’s comprehension of the proceedings and his or her ability to assist counsel
suggests a focus on defendant’s thinking for both components of competency.
The Dusky opinion is extremely brief–its 231 words are fewer than the 267 words
uttered by Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address71–and was written at the time the Court
granted the defendant’s writ of certiorari agreeing to hear the case, not after the Court held
a hearing and heard arguments on the issue.72 In a memorandum to the Court, the Solicitor
General, arguing on behalf of the federal government, acknowledged that the district
judge’s finding that the defendant was oriented to time and place and had some recollection

68

362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).

69

Id. at 402 (quoting Memorandum for the United States at 11, Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (No. 504 Misc.)).
70

See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.

71

See Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, available at
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/4403.html (last visited March 2, 2004).
72

Carroll v. Beto, 330 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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of events did not sufficiently support the finding of incompetency.73 The Solicitor General
proposed the “rational understanding” standard as the appropriate standard for measuring a
defendant’s competency. 74 The Supreme Court simply accepted the Solicitor General’s
admission of error and his proposed competency standard.75 The Court neither gave an

73

Memorandum for the United States at 11, Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960) (No. 504 Misc.). Ironically, it appears that the district judge did not rely solely on
the defendant’s orientation to time, place, and person to reach his conclusion that the
defendant was competent. At the competency hearing, after all the evidence was presented,
the judge stated:
I am of the opinion that the evidence that has been developed thus far,
showing as it does that the defendant is oriented as to time and place and
person, understands the nature of the charge that is pending against him,
understands that he is actually being charged with an offense, understands
what that offense is and so far as his ability to recite facts is concerned, in
my opinion is able properly to assist in his own defense to the extent that he
can develop those facts with his own attorney, it is my conclusion that he . .
. is competent to stand trial . . . .
MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 118. In response to the defense attorney’s objection and
exception to the court’s ruling, the district judge added: “As I understand the narrow scope
of the hearing contemplated . . . it simply is an action for us to determine whether he is
sufficiently oriented as to time, place and person, and if he has a sufficient amount of
background facts that he can work with counsel . . . .” Id. at 119.
74

Memorandum for the United States, supra note 73, at 11.

75

Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. The Solicitor General also proposed that if on remand the
district judge determined on the basis of additional evidence that the defendant was
competent to stand trial, the defendant’s conviction “may properly stand, unless the trial
judge, in his discretion, deems it appropriate to grant a new trial.” Memorandum for the
United States, supra note 73, at 12-13. The Supreme Court did not accept this proposal,
remanding the case for a new hearing on the issue of the defendant’s present competency to
stand trial and for a new trial if the defendant was found competent. Dusky, 362 U.S. at
403.
At his first trial, Dusky’s defense of insanity was rejected, and he was sentenced to a
forty-five-year term of imprisonment for the crime of unlawfully transporting in interstate
-22-
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explanation of its holding nor explained the meaning of any terms in the test.76
In the more than forty years since Dusky was decided, only a handful of states have
enacted statutes incorporating the Supreme Court’s standard.77 Most have continued to use
the common law codification that does not specifically mention the words “rational
understanding.” Although state legislatures have not rushed to embrace the Dusky standard,
many state courts have done so. Even though the Supreme Court in Dusky was only
interpreting the federal competency statute, state courts in interpreting their states’
competency statutes have quoted the Dusky language verbatim, accepting the Dusky

commerce a girl who had been kidnapped. After the Supreme Court’s decision, Dusky was
again found competent to stand trial in a hearing that used the Supreme Court’s “rational
understanding” standard. At trial, Dusky’s insanity defense was rejected, and he received a
lighter sentence of twenty years, with a possibility of parole after five years. He was
released on parole before his sentence expired. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 11, at 878-79.
76

The Honorable John W. Oliver, United States District Court Judge for the Western
District of Missouri, remarked: “No one quarrels with what the Supreme Court actually
held in Dusky; unhappiness with Dusky is produced by the fact that the Supreme Court said
so little as to why it held what it did.” John W. Oliver, Judicial Hearings to Determine
Competency to Stand Trial, in SENTENCING INSTITUTE OF NINTH CIRCUIT, 39 F.R.D. 523,
537, 543 (1965).
77

See FLA. STAT . ANN. § 916.12(1) (West 2001) (adopting the Dusky standard but
requiring that for a finding of incompetency that the defendant have “no” rational or factual
understanding of the proceedings); N.H. REV. STAT . ANN. § 135:17(II)(b) (Supp. 2003);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.B.003(a)(1),(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-15-2 (2003). Additionally, an Arizona statute specifically adopts the Dusky
standard for defendants under the age of eighteen years, but does not adopt the Dusky
standard for adult defendants. ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 13-4501(2) (West 2001).
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standard as the required standard for measuring competency. 78 These decisions have
occurred with such frequency that some commentators have asserted that all states
construe their statutes to conform with the Dusky standard.79 One authority declared: “In
considering the criteria for determining competence to stand trial, one must begin–and
indeed, end–with the criteria set forth in Dusky v. United States.”80
Dusky has been deified, not only by state courts and commentators, but by the

78

See, e.g., Deason v. State, 562 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Ark. 1978); State v. Johnson, 751
A.2d 298, 314 (Conn. 2000) (stating that the Connecticut statutory definition “mirrors the
federal competency standard enunciated in Dusky”); Hardy v. State, 716 So. 2d 761, 763
(Fla. 1998); Perry v. State, 471 N.E.2d 270, 274 ( Ind. 1984); State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d
228, 232-33 (Iowa 1982) (stating that “[t]he critical question is” the Dusky standard);
Commonwealth v. Russin, 649 N.E.2d 750, 755 (Mass. 1995); State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d
494, 507 (Mo. 1994); State v. Garner, 36 P.3d 346, 352 (Mont. 2001); Melchor-Gloria v.
State, 660 P.2d 109, 113 (Nev. 1983); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997) (stating that the Dusky standard is “[t]he constitutional test under the
Fourteenth Amendment”); Commonwealth v. Haag, 809 A.2d 271, 284 n.14 (Pa. 2002);
State v. Garfoot, 558 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Wis. 1997) (stating that “[t]he basic test for
determining competency was established by the United States Supreme Court in Dusky”
and that the Wisconsin statute “is the codification of the Dusky test”).
79

See, e.g., Debra Whitcomb & Ronald L. Brandt, Competency to Stand Trial 1
(Nat’l Inst. Just. Policy Brief 1985) (asserting that the Dusky “standard has been adopted in
every state, either through court decision or by legislation”); Bruce J. Winick,
Incompetency to Stand Trial: Developments in the Law, in MENTALLY DISORDERED
OFFENDERS : PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3, 6 (John Monahan & Henry
J. Steadman eds. 1983) (asserting that “all jurisdictions construe their respective statutory
formulation in conformity with [Dusky]”). But see MARK C. BARDWELL & BRUCE A.
ARRIGO, CRIMINAL COMPETENCY ON TRIAL 35 (2002) (asserting that “many state
jurisdictions follow Dusky in substance or use a variation of Dusky’s test”); Peter R. Silten
& Richard Tullis, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1053,
1059 (1977) (asserting that most states have adopted competency standards equivalent to
Dusky either by statute or case law).
80

Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to
Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985).
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Supreme Court itself. Although the Dusky decision involved only the interpretation of the
federal statute, and although fifteen years after Dusky, the Court stated that Dusky was the
approved standard “as to federal cases,”81 subsequent cases seem to read Dusky more
expansively. For example, in its 1993 decision in Godinez v. Moran,82 the Court stated
that a criminal defendant may not be tried unless competent and added that in Dusky, “we
held that the standard for competence to stand trial is [the Dusky standard].”83 Three years
later, in Cooper v. Oklahoma,84 the Court stated that the standard for measuring
competence “is well settled,”85 citing the Dusky decision and quoting the Dusky standard as
the “well settled” standard.86
In Godinez, the Court considered whether the competency standard for pleading
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing
trial.87 The Court ruled that because a defendant who stands trial will be confronted with
strategic choices that entail relinquishment of the same rights that are relinquished by a
defendant who pleads guilty—such as whether to testify and thereby waive the privilege

81

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).

82

509 U.S. 389(1993).

83

Id. at 396.

84

517 U.S. 348 (1996).

85

Id. at 354.

86

Id.

87

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391.
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against self-incrimination, whether to waive a trial by jury, and whether to waive the right to
confront his or her accusers by declining to cross-examine witnesses–no basis existed for
requiring a higher level of competence for defendants who choose to plead guilty rather
than proceed to trial. 88 “If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not
guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty.”89
The implication of this statement is that the Dusky standard is not merely adequate
for all competency issues in a criminal trial, it is the standard that meets the minimum
constitutional requirement for competency. Justice Thomas ended his majority opinion in
Godinez by remarking that the competency requirement “seeks to ensure that [the criminal
defendant] has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.”90 As
stated, Justice Thomas was quoting the common law standard. But then he added: “[W]hile
States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky
formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements.”91
Neither the concurring nor the dissenting justices in Godinez disputed the apparent

88

Id. at 398-99. The decision to plead guilty, said the Court, “is no more
complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make
during the course of a trial.” Id. at 398. The Court also noted that the competence issue
for waiver of the right to counsel is whether the defendant is competent to waive the right,
not whether the defendant is competent to represent himself or herself. Id. at 399.
Competence to represent oneself has no bearing upon one’s competence to choose selfrepresentation. Id. at 400.
89

Id. at 399.

90

Id. at 402.

91

Id.
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elevation of the Dusky standard to the constitutional minimum requirement. In concurring,
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, wrote:
This Court set forth the standard for competency to stand trial in Dusky
. . . . We have not suggested that the Dusky competency standard applies
during the course of, but not before, trial. . . . The Due Process Clause
does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages
of or for different decisions made during the criminal proceedings.92
In dissenting, Justice Blackmun, in an opinion joined by Justice Stevens, did not
challenge the Dusky standard’s applicability to the competency to stand trial question.
Rather, Justice Blackmun disputed the applicability of the Dusky standard to a defendant’s
decision to plead guilty or to proceed without an attorney. 93 As he noted, a person who is
competent to play basketball (or to stand trial with the assistance of an attorney) is not
thereby competent to play the violin (or plead guilty or stand trial without the assistance of
an attorney).94
In summary, the creation of a constitutional standard for competency to stand trial is
a most disconcerting example of Supreme Court decision making. In Dusky, the Court
adopted verbatim for federal cases a standard of competency suggested by the Solicitor
General in a memorandum to the Court.95 The Dusky opinion was written at the time the

92

Id. at 403-04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

93

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 412 -16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

94

Id. at 413.

95

Memorandum for the United States, supra note 73, at 11, adopted in Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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Court granted certiorari. 96 The Court heard no argument on the appropriateness of the
standard, and it made no analysis of the standard.97 In Godinez, the Court anointed the
Dusky standard, proclaiming it the constitutional minimum standard for all criminal cases,
and not just for the issue of competency to stand trial, but for other competency issues as
well.98 The Court heard no argument on the appropriateness of elevating the Dusky standard
to constitutional status, and it made no analysis of the issue.

III. Assessing Competency Assessments: Evaluating the Evaluators
Although Godinez holds that the Dusky standard is the constitutional minimum for
all competency to stand trial decisions,99 do psychiatrists and psychologists apply the
Dusky standard to all competency assessments, and are they instructed to do so by the trial
courts who typically accept the evaluator’s judgment of the defendant’s competence as
their own? Or do courts instruct the evaluators using the language of the statutory standard
in their jurisdiction? The question is not merely of academic interest, particularly in
jurisdictions that distinguish “rational manner” from “rational understanding.” For example,
in a recent case heard in the San Diego County Superior Court, the trial judge, acting on the
prosecutor’s request, instructed one of the co-authors that in testifying about the ability of

96

Carroll v. Beto, 330 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Tex. 1971).

97

See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.

98

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398-99. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.

99

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398-99.
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the defendant to assist counsel, the witness should not testify about the defendant’s ability
to think rationally, because under the California “rational manner” competency standard,
the question of the defendant’s ability to assist counsel is determined solely by the extent
to which the defendant’s capacity to act rationally has been impaired by his or her mental
condition.100 This interpretation may not be the correct interpretation or even the most
appropriate interpretation of the “rational manner” standard.101 Nevertheless, it is a
statutory construction that is being applied today by some courts.
A. Methodology
To inquire into forensic evaluators’ understanding of the competency standard (or
standards), the authors conducted a survey of forensic psychiatrists and forensic
psychologists who were asked to read two case study vignettes and assess the competency
of each criminal defendant using three differently-worded standards of
competency–Dusky’s “rational understanding” standard, the “rational manner” standard, and
the federal statutory standard that does not use the word “rational.”102 As mentioned above,

100

In the case, the district attorney requested that the judge clarify the meaning of the
term “rational manner.” The district attorney wanted to limit the testimony of the forensic
expert to the question of whether the defendant was capable of acting rationally. The public
defender wanted the expert to testify about whether the defendant was capable of thinking
rationally. After a meeting in the judge’s chambers with the attorneys, the judge instructed
the expert to limit his testimony as requested by the district attorney. E-mail from David
Naimark to Grant Morris (May 2, 2004, 22:11:44 PDT) (on file with Professor Morris).
101

See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions
equating the “reasonable manner” standard with the “rational understanding” standard).
102

For a more comprehensive analysis of the survey data, see Grant H. Morris et al.,
Assessing Competency Competently: Toward a Rational Standard for Competency to
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the federal statutory standard is similar to the statutory standard found in many state
statutes, merely requiring that the defendant have a mental disease or defect that makes him
or her unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings or to assist in
his or her defense.103 Unlike most state statutes, however, the federal statute specifies that
to be competent, the defendant must be able to “assist properly” in his or her defense.104
The objective of the survey was to discover whether forensic examiners would distinguish
between the standards (i.e., find the defendant competent under one standard but not under
another) or whether they would find the defendant competent under all standards or
incompetent under all standards.
A questionnaire was mailed to the 922 individuals who are Board Certified in
Forensic Psychiatry and who are also members of the American Academy of Psychiatry and
Law and to the 189 individuals who are Diplomates in Forensic Psychology from the
American Board of Forensic Psychology. 105 The two case study vignettes appear in Table 1.

Stand Trial Assessments, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
(in press 2004) (including
a discussion dividing the survey results into various subcategories: discipline of the
respondent (either psychiatrist or psychologist), jurisdiction in which the respondent
conducts his or her primary practice (either “rational understanding” or “rational manner”
jurisdiction), amount of experience of the respondent (either inexperienced or
experienced)).
103

18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(d) (West 2000).

104

See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The federal statutory standard was
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Dusky to be the “rational understanding” standard.
105

Of this total of 1111 questionnaires distributed, forty-eight (i.e., thirty-five
mailed to psychiatrists and thirteen mailed to psychologists) were returned by the post
office as undeliverable. Thus, the questionnaire was mailed successfully to 1063
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[AUTHOR’S NOTE: ALL OF TABLE 1 MUST APPEAR ON THE SAME PAGE]
Table 1
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL VIGNETTES
Vignette # 1. A 42-year-old male defendant is charged with stalking a famous movie actor. He tells
the forensic examiner that he will plead “not guilty” as he was acting in “self defense”. The defendant
completely understands the nature of the criminal proceedings. Regarding his defensive strategy, he
explains that the actor implanted microchips into his brain and was controlling his behavior through
these microchips by administering painful electric shocks to him each time the defendant behaved in a
way that the actor did not like. Apart from the alleged stalking, the defendant’s behavior and speech
was and remains normal.
Vignette #2. A 23-year-old female defendant is charged with murdering her husband after learning
that he was having an affair with her sister. Upon being arrested, she became belligerent with the sheriff
leading to her being “hog tied”. Once in jail, she was “pepper sprayed” by the jail staff after she
refused to comply with directions. The jail psychiatrist diagnoses the defendant with impulse control
disorder not otherwise specified (NOS) and offers her medication, which she refuses. In court, she
screams profanities at the judge, spits at the bailiff, and turns over the defense table. She is selectively
mute with the forensic examiner but knows why she is in jail and argues: “The dirty bum deserved what
he got.”
_____________________________________________________________________________

In the first vignette, the facts indicate that the defendant’s thinking is impaired
although his behavior, other than in committing the crime itself, is normal. Thus, if there is
a meaningful difference between the “rational understanding” standard and the “rational
manner” standard, we hypothesized that the defendant in the first vignette could be viewed
as not having a rational understanding of the issues, but as able to conduct his arguably
irrational defense in a rational manner. In contrast, in the second vignette, the defendant’s
individuals.
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behavior is impaired–she is belligerent, screams profanities, and refuses to comply with
directions–but her thinking is not. We hypothesized that the defendant in the second
vignette could be viewed as having a rational understanding of the proceedings, but as not
able to conduct her defense in a rational manner.
B. Results
A total of 273 psychiatrists and psychologists responded to the questionnaire, which
is a response rate of 25.7%.106 Although most respondents answered all questions, a few
did not.107 Table 2 includes all answers that were submitted by those who responded.

[AUTHOR’S NOTE: ALL OF TABLE 2 MUST APPEAR ON THE SAME PAGE]
Table 2
RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Vignette 1
Standard Applied

Defendant Competent

Defendant Incompetent

106

All responses received within two months of mailing the questionnaire are
included within the data. Twelve additional responses were received subsequently, raising
the number of responses to 285 (response rate: 26.8%), but these additional responses
were not included within the data.
107

A total of 259 respondents answered all three questions to the first vignette; 237
answered all three questions to the second vignette. Fourteen respondents answered only
some or none of the questions to the first vignette; thirty-six respondents answered only
some or none of the questions to the second vignette.
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Rational Understanding

128 (47.6%)

Rational Manner

141 (52.4%)

104 (39.4%)

160 (60.6%)

Assist Properly
130 (49.2%)
134 (50.8%)
Respondents who reached the identical conclusion under all three standards: 196 (75.7%)
Defendant competent under all three standards: 87 (44.4%)
Defendant incompetent under all three standards: 109 (55.6%)
Respondents who did not reach the identical conclusion under all three standards: 63 (24.3%)

Vignette 2
Standard Applied
Rational Understanding

Defendant Competent
169 (70.1%)

Rational Manner
Assist Properly

Defendant Incompetent
72 (29.9%)

149 (61.1%)
149 (62.1%)

95 (38.9%)
91 (37.9%)

Respondents who reached the identical conclusion under all three standards: 185 (78.1%)
Defendant competent under all three standards: 130 (70.3%)
Defendant incompetent under all three standards: 55 (29.7%)
Respondents who did not reach the identical conclusion under all three standards: 52 (21.9%)

The data reveal that in answering Vignette 1, respondents divided almost equally in
deciding whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. In applying Dusky’s “rational
understanding” standard, 47.6% found the defendant competent, 52.4% found him
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incompetent. In applying the “rational manner” standard, 39.4% found the defendant
competent, 60.6% found him incompetent. The result was closest when respondents
applied the federal statutory standard which does not use the word “rational” at all and
focuses only on whether the defendant can “assist properly” in his defense. Under that
standard, 49.2% found the defendant competent (130 respondents), and 50.8% found him
incompetent (134 respondents).
There was somewhat greater agreement among respondents in analyzing Vignette 2.
In applying the “rational understanding” standard, 70.1% found the defendant competent,
and 29.9% found her incompetent. In applying the “rational manner” standard, 61.1% found
the defendant competent, and 38.9% found her incompetent. In applying the “assist
properly” standard, 62.1% found the defendant competent, and 37.9% found her
incompetent.
In responding to both vignettes, more than three-fourths of respondents either found
the defendant competent under all three standards or incompetent under all three standards.
For the first vignette, 75.7% did not differentiate the result based on the standard applied;
for the second vignette, 78.1% did not. Of those who did not differentiate, 44.4% found
the defendant in Vignette 1 competent, and 55.6% found the defendant incompetent under
all three standards. Of those who did not differentiate, 70.3% found the defendant in
Vignette 2 competent, and 29.7% found the defendant incompetent under all three
standards.
If our hypothesis regarding the vignettes is correct, the defendant in Vignette 1
-34-
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should have been found incompetent under Dusky’s “rational understanding” standard and
under the federal statutory standard interpreted to be the Dusky standard, but competent
under the “rational manner”standard. Only two of the 259 respondents (0.8%) reached that
conclusion. In fact, fourteen respondents (5.4%) reached the opposite conclusion. By our
hypothesis, the defendant in Vignette 2 should have been found competent under the Dusky
standard and the federal statutory standard, but incompetent under the “rational manner”
standard. Only six of the 237 respondents (2.5%) reached that conclusion; three (1.3%)
reached the opposite conclusion.
C. Discussion
1. The Divided Response to the First Vignette
The nearly equally-divided response to the first vignette is not merely surprising, it
is shocking. When 128 forensic psychiatrists and psychologists analyze a fact situation
(including the defendant’s mental condition) and, applying the Dusky standard, find the
defendant competent to stand trial, and 141 forensic psychiatrists and psychologists
analyze the same facts and apply the same legal standard but reach the opposite conclusion,
the message is clear: Something is terribly wrong. When 130 forensic psychiatrists and
psychologists analyze a fact situation (including the defendant’s mental condition) and,
applying the federal statutory standard–a standard interpreted by the Supreme Court to be
the Dusky standard–find the defendant competent to stand trial, and 134 forensic
psychiatrists and psychologists analyze the exact same facts and apply the exact same legal
standard but reach the opposite conclusion, the message is clear: The defendant’s fate
-35-
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depends only upon who performed the evaluation.
These nearly equal splits of opinion are certainly not a mere fluke of the sample.
Even if the true population of forensic psychiatrists and psychologists would analyze a fact
situation and, applying the Dusky standard would agree on the defendant’s competence only
70% of the time, the chances of obtaining the relatively even split of opinion that was
observed in the sample (128 to 141) would be less than one in one billion (1.067 X 10-9 or
.000000001067). Similarly, if the true population of forensic psychiatrists and
psychologists would analyze a fact situation and, applying the federal statutory standard
would agree on the defendant’s competence only 70% of the time, the chances of obtaining
the relatively even split of opinion that was observed in the sample (130 to 134) would be
less than one in one billion (2.214 X 10-10 or .0000000002214).
If an 80% rate of agreement among the true population of forensic psychiatrists and
psychologists could be anticipated, the chances of obtaining the relatively even splits of
opinion that were observed in the sample would be less than one in ten quadrillions (or one
in 10,000 trillions or one in ten million billions, i.e., 10-16). Although one in one billion
and one in ten quadrillions are mathematically very different, they “are really just two
different ways to say never.”108
If judges rely on the expertise of forensic evaluators to determine a defendant’s

108

E-mail from Professor Cameron Parker, University of San Diego Department of
Mathematics and Computer Science, to Grant Morris, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego School of Law (Oct. 18, 2003, 11:51:38 PDT) (on file with Professor Morris).
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competence,,and they surely do,109 then it is appropriate to ask whether those evaluators
have such expertise. Are forensic psychiatrists and psychologists competent to assess
competence? If the finding of competence or incompetence depends not on a scientific
evaluation of the facts and the application of a legal standard to those facts, but rather, on an
evaluation process that has no inter-rater reliability, the message is clear: We are truly
“flipping coins in the courtroom!”110
It is easy to shoot the messenger. We acknowledge that the use of a vignette format
to assess a defendant’s competence–especially when the vignette provides very limited
data–does not equate with a forensic evaluation of a real defendant. Obviously, the
psychiatrists and psychologists who participated in our survey did not have the opportunity
to ask the questions they wanted to ask. They did not make their own diagnostic assessment
and apply their findings to the applicable legal standard. To encourage them to respond to
the questionnaire, the authors intentionally summarized the information available and did
not include information that many evaluators might think important, if not determinative of
their findings–for example, information on the interaction of the defendant with his or her
attorney.

109

See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.

110

The language: “flipping coins in the courtroom,” is derived from the title of a
controversial, but influential, law review article that questioned the expertise of
psychiatrists to predict dangerousness. See generally Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R.
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 694 (1974).
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Both vignettes, however, were based on actual cases.111 Although the information
provided was limited, we believe that the data provided was sufficient–at least minimally
sufficient–for the respondent to make a decision. In fact, some respondents commended
us for the first vignette, declaring: “Good example” and “Excellent vignette.” One
respondent asserted: “It’s a no brainer.” Nevertheless, half the brains who evaluated those
facts found the defendant competent and half found him incompetent. Additionally, the
first vignette involves a real world fact situation in which defense counsel might raise the
issue of competency to stand trial–the defendant has committed a criminal act because of a
delusional belief but is unwilling to consider an insanity defense because he does not
consider his belief to be delusional.
Although we provided no information about the actual interaction of the defendant
with his attorney, often such information is not available. Richard Bonnie noted, “In most
cases, questions about ‘competence to assist counsel’ arise at the outset of the process,
before significant interactions with counsel have occurred and before strategic decisions
regarding defense of the case have been encountered or considered.”112 Even when such
interaction has occurred, Gary Melton and his colleagues observed: “In our experience
most attorneys have neither the time nor the inclination to observe, much less participate

111

The vignettes were based on the facts of People v. Napolis and People v.
Bonigionanni. These cases were trial court cases in the San Diego County Superior Court
and are unavailable on Lexis and Westlaw.
112

Bonnie, supra note 15, at 556.
-38-

Published by Digital USD, 2004

39

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 19 [2004]

in, competency-to-stand-trial evaluations.”113 In any event, we note that currently evaluators
are asked to assess the defendant’s ability or capacity to assist his or her attorney, not the
quality of the actual interaction that has occurred between them.
Almost all respondents were willing to answer the first vignette despite the lack of
information about the defendant’s interaction with his attorney. Only two of the 273
respondents (0.7%) failed to answer at least one question about Vignette 1. In contrast,
twenty-eight respondents (10.3%) failed to answer at least one question about Vignette 2.
Most of those respondents simply asserted that they were unable to make a judgment
without more information than was provided in the vignette. Five of the twenty-eight
specifically mentioned the lack of information about the defendant’s interaction with her
attorney. If, however, such information is not commonly available to forensic evaluators,
then the fault lies not with the researchers who failed to provide the information in their
questionnaire. Rather, the fault lies with a legal system that routinely permits a defendant’s
competence to be evaluated without providing the evaluator with information about the
attorney/client interaction that is essential to that evaluation. Ironically, although
respondents were more reluctant to answer the second vignette questions than the first, for
those who did respond, there was far more agreement in their answers to the second
vignette than to the first.
2. Analysis of Respondents’ Comments

113

MELTON ET AL ., supra note 10, at 142.
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To encourage a large response to the questionnaire, respondents were not required
to explain their answers. Thus, the reasons underlying the respondents’ conclusions cannot
be systematically evaluated. Nevertheless, we did provide space on the questionnaire for
respondents to comment on each vignette and on their responses to each vignette if they
wished to do so. More than half the respondents availed themselves of the opportunity to
comment on Vignette 1, and an equal number commented on Vignette 2.114 These
comments provide insight into the respondents’ decision making process.
a. Vignette 1: An Irrational Defendant Who Acts in a Rational Manner
Those respondents who found the Vignette 1 defendant incompetent focused on the
defendant’s delusion (that the actor implanted microchips in the defendant’s brain and was
controlling the defendant’s behavior by administering electric shocks to him through those
microchips) and his self defense plea based on that delusion. Several respondents
expressed the opinion that the defendant’s decision making was so impaired that he would
not be able to assist in his defense. Others expressed concern that the defendant’s delusion
would preclude him from rationally considering an insanity defense or a plea of guilty.
Although the defendant’s delusional self-defense argument is not likely to be
successful, his “not guilty” plea might be. For example, to be guilty of the crime of
stalking in California, the defendant must “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” follow

114

A total of 146 comments were received on each vignette, although some
respondents commented only on Vignette 1, and some respondents commented only on
Vignette 2.
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another person. 115 It is quite possible that the defendant in the first vignette might be found
“not guilty” of the crime because he acted in response to his delusional belief and not with
the requisite malice. Under such a scenario, the defendant would have a delusional reason
for pursuing a rational defense.
Even if that argument would not succeed, one might well question whether the
defendant is incompetent simply because he might not allow his lawyer to raise an insanity
defense that might prevent criminal conviction. In California, unless either a temporary
restraining order or injunction has been issued against the stalker,116 or unless the stalker
has previously been convicted of certain enumerated felonies117–prerequisites that were not
mentioned in the vignette–the maximum penalty for the crime of stalking is only one year
in the county jail.118 Most criminal defense lawyers would not want to risk an insanity

115

CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 2004). The crime of stalking also
requires that the defendant make “a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family.” Id.
116

Id. § 646.9(b). Violation of this provision is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for two, three, or four years. Id.
117

Id. § 646.9(c). Violation of this provision is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for two, three, or five years if the defendant has previously been convicted of:
(1) wilful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or former spouse, co-habitant or former
co-habitant, or person who is the mother or father of the defendant’s child; (2) intentional
and knowing violation of a protective order; (3) wilful threatening of death or great bodily
injury to another; or (4) stalking. Id.
118

Id. § 646.9(a).
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defense–and indefinite post-trial commitment of their client119–when conviction would
result in such a relatively small punishment. These insights suggest that forensic evaluators
should not “play lawyer” and make assumptions about what defenses are likely to be raised
at trial and their potential for success. They also suggest that evaluators need to interact
with defense attorneys prior to conducting their evaluations to understand why the issue of
competence to stand trial was raised (whether by the defense attorney, prosecutor, or court
on its own motion) and what the defense strategy is likely to be.
Respondents who found the Vignette 1 defendant competent typically explained that
although the defendant was delusional regarding the actor he stalked, the defendant’s
delusion was “encapsulated” and did not affect his understanding of the criminal process or
his ability to assist his attorney. Several respondents expressed their view that the
defendant was competent but should be found not guilty by reason of insanity. A few
respondents suggested that although “this is a close call,” the information that was provided
did not overcome the presumption of competency.
b. Vignette 2: A Rational Defendant Who Acts in an Irrational Manner
In responding to Vignette 2, those who found the defendant incompetent focused on
her behavior when she was arrested (she became belligerent), in jail (she refused to comply
with directions), in court (she screamed profanities at the judge, spit at the bailiff, and
119

Id. § 1026(a) & (b) (West Supp. 2004). The insanity acquittee is confined a state
hospital until his or her sanity has been restored. The California Supreme Court has
interpreted restoration to sanity to require that the defendant not be a danger to the health
or safety of himself or herself or others. In re Franklin, 496 P.2d 465, 477 (Cal. 1972).
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turned over the defense table), and with the forensic examiner (she was selectively mute).
Such behavior suggested that the defendant would not be able to work cooperatively with or
assist counsel. A few respondents characterized the defendant as “out of control.” Some
questioned the jail psychiatrist’s diagnosis, asserting that the defendant may be psychotic or
manic. A few commented that although the defendant was presently incompetent, the
problem was not likely to be a long-term problem.
In contrast, those who found the Vignette 2 defendant competent (and they were the
clear majority of all respondents), typically asserted that the defendant had the capacity, but
not the willingness to cooperate. Despite her anger, her decision to be uncooperative was a
voluntary choice on her part. As a second major reason for finding the defendant
competent, many respondents focused on the psychiatric diagnosis. Several noted that the
defendant either had no mental disorder or only a personality disorder but did not have a
psychosis or other Axis I disorder that interfered with her cognitive abilities. Some
respondents specifically questioned the jail psychiatrist’s diagnosis. One characterized the
diagnosis of impulse control disorder as “next to useless.” A second declared that the
diagnosis “sounds improbable.” A third suggested that borderline personality disorder and
antisocial personality disorder might be more appropriate diagnoses, and a fourth suggested
malingering. A few respondents relied upon the presumption of competence and the lack
of any evidence of the defendant’s belligerence toward her attorney.
In most states, to find a defendant incompetent to stand trial, his or her lack of
capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in the defense must be the result of
-43-
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mental disorder.120 The authors specifically included the information about the jail
psychiatrist’s diagnosis to assure that respondents directed their attention to the capacity
issue and did not simply claim that the Vignette 2 defendant was merely angry but not
mentally disordered. Frankly, we were surprised that so many respondents took issue with
the statement that the jail psychiatrist determined that the defendant had a mental disorder
and that the specific diagnosis was impulse control disorder NOS. After all, the law does
not require psychosis as a prerequisite for incompetency. And yet, many respondents
seemed to impose just such a requirement. In essence, unless the defendant was psychotic,
he or she was not considered to be “sick” enough to be found incompetent to stand trial.
Admittedly, a psychotic defendant is a prime candidate for a finding of
incompetency, especially if the delusions he or she experiences relate directly to the
criminal process or the defense attorney. Such a defendant may lack a rational
understanding of the proceedings and may not be able to consult with the attorney with a
rational understanding as required by the Dusky standard. But if competency is measured
by whether the defendant can assist counsel in a rational manner, other mental disorders
may qualify. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders states that “[t]he essential feature of Impulse-Control Disorders is the
failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an act that is harmful to the

120

Some states use alternative language to “mental disorder,” such as “mental
disability,” “mental disease,” or “mental defect.”
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person or to others.”121 Although a person can be diagnosed with impulse control disorder
even if that person is not completely unable to control his or her harmful behavior,
nevertheless, some degree of difficulty in controlling one’s harmful impulse is necessarily
implied by the diagnosis. After all, if a person has normal impulse control, he or she
should not be diagnosed with this mental disorder. If the difficulty in controlling one’s
harmful impulses is sufficiently severe, it might result in courtroom outbursts or other
behavior that prevents the defendant from assisting in his or her defense in a rational
manner.
c. Other Comments: Confusing Clinical Considerations with Forensic
Assessment
Some comments suggest that some evaluators equate a finding of incompetency
with the severity of the defendant’s mental disorder rather than how that disorder
incapacitates the defendant from achieving the level of competency required by the law’s
standard. Diagnosis, however, is not the only criterion used by these evaluators. In
addition, consideration is also given to treatment that will enhance the defendant’s
capabilities–even if the defendant may be competent at the time of the evaluation. For
example, in finding the Vignette 1 defendant incompetent, one respondent wrote, “[I]n our
jurisdiction, we error [sic] on the side of providing treatment to impaired individuals so that
the integrity of the trial is protected.” Another wrote: “Defendant should have [an]

121

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 663 (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed. text revision 2000).
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opportunity to be treated before he makes a final choice of defenses.” A third asserted: “In
my state this individual would be treated prior to determining whether he could be tried
despite the delusional beliefs that were the basis of his crime.”
Treatment concerns were also a consideration for some of those who found the
Vignette 2 defendant incompetent. For example, one asserted: “This woman most likely is
a behavior problem but, in my opinion, should be assessed and treated if possible on an
inpatient unit where she would be court committed (forensic unit) as incompetent.”
Another wrote: “She appears to need medication. I would lean toward unfit with a greater
period of observation as an inpatient.” Some would find the defendant incompetent so that
she would have an opportunity to calm down before the trial could proceed. As one
respondent phrased it: “In real life where I practice, this lady would be given the opportunity
to ‘chill,’ during which time she might better understand where her best interests lie.”
Evaluators eager to improve the mental condition of a criminal defendant should not be
tempted to find a competent defendant incompetent in order to delay trial and provide
treatment that the evaluator believes is desirable.
The authors do not mean to suggest that only clinical concerns may bias an
evaluator’s findings. For example, one respondent offered a policy judgment to support his
conclusion that both vignette defendants should be found competent. He asserted: “A
rational system of criminal justice would never permit depriving a defendant of the right to
a speedy trial.” However, that policy judgment, which would preclude defendants being
found incompetent to stand trial, has not been adopted by our society. If an evaluator
-46-
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accepts the responsibility of performing an evaluation for the court, he or she should also
accept the rules under which that evaluation is performed.
3. Assessing Competency: Three Standards or Only One?
How can one explain why more than three-fourths of all respondents did not
differentiate between the various standards of competency in answering the questions
posed in Vignette 1 and Vignette 2?122 There are several possible explanations. As the
authors have suggested, some respondents may have based their decisions, not on the
language of the competency standards, but rather, on clinical issues such as the defendant’s
diagnosis (i.e., whether he or she is “sick” enough)123 or the perceived need for treatment
(i.e., would the defendant benefit from treatment before he or she stands trial).124 Several
comments suggest that differences in the competency standard were irrelevant to some
respondents’ decision making on the first vignette. For example, one respondent wrote:
“This defendant should be incompetent to stand trial under any standard.” (emphasis in
original). Another wrote: “It is hard to imagine any standard by which an individual with
such a bizarre delusion about the offense [would be competent].” A third asserted: “This
one’s a bit obvious–the defendant is so clearly irrational.” And a fourth: “He seems clearly
impaired–regardless of the standard.” A fifth also acknowledged the irrelevancy of the

122

See supra text following Table 2.

123

See supra Part IIIC2b.

124

See supra Part IIIC2c.
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legal standard, asserting: “Irrespective of the specific legal definition of competency, . . .
I’d conclude he is incompetent based on active psychosis that impairs his reasoning ability
and judgment.”
In answering the second vignette, one respondent, who questioned the impulse
control disorder diagnosis, seemed to suggest that the defendant should be found
incompetent, under all three standards, so that she could be medicated over her objection.
The respondent wrote: “[G]iven the severity of her control lapses, I have to wonder about a
mood disorder. Her refusal of medications, if it persists, may result in the court ordering
medication over [her] objection, for which she must first be found incompetent to stand
trial.”
Some respondents may have based their decisions on the competency standard used
in the jurisdiction in which they practiced and then applied that decision to the other
standards with which they were less familiar. Some may not have understood the
differences between the standards or did not accept those differences even if they did
understand them. For example, one respondent asserted, “I’m not impressed with the
standards . . . really being different.” Another perceived the issue in the first vignette as
being the defendant’s ability to make a rational choice of defense strategy not affected by
his delusion “regardless of the test’s wording.” This same respondent asserted that for the
second vignette, “Again, the test really doesn’t matter. . . . The exam would focus on what
she’s capable of, not simply the way she now acts, but the wording of the competency
standard is no real help otherwise.” Other respondents did not claim that the wording of the
-48-
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tests was irrelevant but asked for an explanation of operative terms in the various standards.
For example, several questioned the meaning of the words “to assist properly” in the
federal statutory standard. Others questioned the meaning of the words “to assist counsel . .
. in a rational manner” in the “rational manner” standard and “a reasonable degree of rational
understanding” or “a rational as well as factual understanding” in the Dusky standard.
In the authors’ judgment, only one of the 273 respondents adequately explained why
the Vignette 1 defendant might be competent under the “rational manner” language, but be
incompetent under the “rational understanding” and “assist properly” standards. As he or
she commented: “[Rational understanding] seems less restrictive in determining how well
he can assist his attorney. The manner is rational, but his premise is psychotic.” The
respondent added that the “properly assist” requirement of the federal statutory standard
and the “reasonable degree of rational understanding” requirement of the Dusky standard
“raise the threshold needed to be competent.”
Perhaps, however, one should not accept the suggested distinction between Dusky’s
cognitive focus and the “rational manner” standard’s behavioral focus. Perhaps there is
only one appropriate standard of competency, not two or three. In several states that
employ the “rational manner” standard, courts have interpreted their standard to be the
equivalent, or virtual equivalent of Dusky’s “rational understanding” standard. For example,
Michigan’s competency to stand trial statute specifically uses the “rational manner”
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standard.125 In a case that pre-dated, and also presaged, the Supreme Court’s Godinez126
decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected a defendant’s assertion that a higher
standard of competence is required to plead guilty than to stand trial. 127 The court quoted
the Supreme Court’s Dusky “rational understanding” standard, and then stated: “We feel this
is sufficient protection for any defendant, either in standing trial or in submitting a plea.”128
The court then quoted, without further comment, the Michigan statutory standard.129 The
implication is that the two standards are identical.
The Illinois competency statute merely provides: “A defendant is unfit if, because of
his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.”130 In three cases decided in the 1960s,
the Supreme Court of Illinois interpreted that statutory standard to be whether the
defendant “can, in co-operation with his counsel, conduct his defense in a rational and
reasonable manner.”131 Although these cases are not of recent vintage, they were decided

125

MICH. COMP . LAWS ANN. § 330.2020 (West 1999).

126

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). See supra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
127

People v. Belanger, 252 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

725 ILL. COMP . STAT . ANN. 5/104-10 (West 1992).

131

People v. Foley, 192 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ill. 1963); People v. Richeson, 181 N.E.2d
170, 172 (Ill. 1962); Withers v. People, 177 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ill. 1961). See also People
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post-Dusky, and they are the most recent pronouncements on the subject by the Illinois
Supreme Court. That is why we included Illinois as a “rational manner” jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, in 1980, the Illinois Court of Appeals applied Dusky’s “rational
understanding” standard,132 and in 1996, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied
Dusky in a federal habeas corpus proceeding involving an Illinois state prisoner.133
California is also a “rational manner” jurisdiction.134 Although the California
Supreme Court noted that the Dusky decision only involved the United States Supreme
Court’s implementation of the federal statute, nevertheless the California Supreme Court
asserted that the Dusky standard is “nearly identical” to the standard of competency under
the California statute.135 The Indiana Court of Appeals, in comparing the “rational
understanding” standard with the “rational manner” standard, stated: “[R]ather than posing
different tests, these statements represent differently worded versions of the same
inquiry.”136 If, as these appellate court decisions suggest, the standards are identical, or are
at least virtually identical, then respondents who did not distinguish between them did not

v. Bender, 169 N.E. 328, 332 (Ill. 1960) (using similar, but not identical language, i.e.,
whether the defendant “can co-operate with his counsel and conduct his defense in a
rational and reasonable manner” ).
132

People v. Turner, 410 N.E.2d 1151,1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).

133

Eddmonds v. Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996).

134

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a) (West 2000). See supra notes 54-55.

135

People v. Hill, 429 P.2d 586, 593 n. 6 (Cal. 1967).

136

Smith v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1156, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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err in treating them as the same.

IV. Recommendations and Conclusion
More than thirty years ago, an American Bar Foundation study asked: “What are the
professional responsibilities of court, counsel, and doctor in a system which lacks clarity
of purpose and sufficiency of means? Is the whole business an inadvertent mixture of
obsolete forms, bankrupt techniques, and wishful thinking?”137 Although these questions
were directed at all phases of the criminal process in which mental disorder is an issue, the
study maintained that the inquiry into competency to stand trial “is the critical phase in the
classification and disposition of criminal defendants having symptoms of mental
disturbance.”138 If this critical phase of the criminal process is bankrupt, the process itself
is bankrupt.
If, as suggested by the title of this article, competency to stand trial really is on trial,
then it is time to announce the verdict: Guilty as charged! As discussed in Part I, the theory
of adjudicating competency–a beneficent process to assure that the defendant receives a
fair trial–is not matched by the harsh reality of the consequences imposed on the defendant
found incompetent–an in limbo, hybrid status of not quite criminally punishable (though
remaining accused of a crime) and not quite civilly committable (though involuntarily

137

MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 195 (footnote omitted).

138

Id. at 193.
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detained for treatment of the mental condition that rendered the defendant incompetent).139
Despite these consequences, the competency adjudication process has not been taken
seriously, either by prosecutors and defense counsel who raise the issue of competence
and introduce evidence on the issue, or by judges who supposedly consider that evidence
and make their decisions.140 Lawyers may raise the issue of the defendant’s competence
not only when they reasonably believe the defendant is incompetent, but also for tactical
and strategic reasons whenever a psychiatric or psychological examination may be helpful
to their side of the case.141 Judges often defer their judgment on the question of the
defendant’s competence to the expertise of psychiatrists and psychologists whose
testimony and expressed conclusion on the competency issue provides “cover” for judges
who fear reversal on appeal. 142

139

See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.

140

See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.

141

For example, a prosecutor who believes that the defendant may plead an insanity
defense may raise the competency issue to obtain a forensic evaluation of the defendant’s
mental condition at an early stage of the trial process–even though the law typically delays
the prosecutor’s right to an evaluation of the defendant’s sanity until much later, i.e., after
the defendant gives notice of an intent to rely upon a psychiatrist’s or psychologist’s expert
testimony to support an insanity defense. A prosecutor may also raise the competency
issue to divert the defendant into a coerced treatment situation even if the defendant is not
civilly committable. See MELTON ET AL ., supra note 10 and accompanying text. Defense
counsel may raise the competency issue to delay the trial process in an attempt to obtain a
consensual disposition of the case without trial. See MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 89-90
(discussing manipulation of the competency issue for discovery and dispositional
purposes).
142

See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. To assure that a conviction of the
defendant is not reversed on appeal, judges who have no reason to suspect that the
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But do these mental health professionals have the expertise necessary to assess
competency competently and even to decide the competency question? As discussed in
Part III, the study we conducted, though limited to two short vignettes, suggests not.143 The
problem, however, may not lie solely or even primarily with the forensic experts, but
rather, with the legal standard used to assess competency, and with the judges and lawyers
who fail to participate actively in the competency adjudication process.144
A. The Competency Standard: Deifying or De-deifying Dusky?
Psychiatrist and critic Dr. Thomas Szasz once wrote: “When it comes to judging
ability to stand trial, . . . we seem to be at sea, with no compass to guide us.”145 We should
acknowledge the correctness of his insight. Although Szasz wrote his comment almost
forty years ago, just five years after Dusky was decided, his assertion is as accurate today
as when it was written. Our first two recommendations attempt to assure that Szasz’s

defendant is incompetent to stand trial may also raise the competency issue whenever a
defendant pleads insanity.
143

See supra Part III.

144

Because our recommendations are derived from, and respond to, the data from our
study of competence assessment, we do not address all of the systemic problems of the
competency to stand trial issue. Clearly, however, these broader problems need to be
addressed. For example, the competency issue should not be raised by a prosecutor or a
defense attorney merely to achieve some tactical or strategic advantage in the criminal trial
or to achieve diversion of the defendant from the criminal process into the involuntary
mental commitment process. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Similarly,
judges should not raise the competency issue when reasonable cause does not exist to
believe that the defendant is incompetent. See supra note 142.
145

THOMAS S. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 27 (1965).
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insight does not remain accurate for another forty years.
Although the data from our study are disturbing, one need not conclude that
competency cannot be assessed competently and that we should abandon the effort
altogether. The Supreme Court will not allow us to do so. As mentioned previously, the
Court has specifically prohibited the trial of incompetent criminal defendants.146 Trial of
potentially incompetent defendants without an inquiry into their competency is simply not a
viable option.147
Even Dr. Szasz did not call for elimination of the competence inquiry. Szasz’s
remedy was to exclude psychiatrists and psychologists from the process of evaluating the
defendant and from deciding the defendant’s competence to stand trial or serving as expert
witnesses on the subject. Rather, he would place the responsibility for deciding the
defendant’s competency in the hands of a judge or panel of judges, a lawyer or panel of
lawyers, or a lay jury.148 But our data do not support this remedy. The two vignettes used in

146

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (stating that the prohibition of trial of an incompetent defendant
“is fundamental to an adversary system of justice”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966) (acknowledging that “the conviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process”).
147

See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to abolish or
to allow waiver of the competency issue and explaining why such proposals are not likely to
succeed).
148

SZASZ, supra note 145, at 255-56. See supra note 15 and accompanying text
(discussing other proposals to involve the defense attorney in deciding whether the
defendant is competent to proceed).
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our study were not typical cases. Rarely do evaluators confront defendants who are
irrational but who act in a rational manner (Vignette 1) or who are rational but who act in an
irrational manner (Vignette 2). Often the issue of competence is easier to assess and to
determine. We are not prepared to exclude psychiatrists and psychologists from assisting
courts in resolving the competency issue. Although our recommendations are more
modest, nevertheless, we believe they are essential to assure that competency is assessed
competently.
Recommendation 1. The “rational manner” standard for judging a defendant’s
competency to stand trial should be eliminated. The “rational manner” standard was
introduced to American jurisprudence in 1847.149 However appropriate it may have been
for decision making at that time–a time when James Polk was President150–it is
inappropriate today. The standard is ambiguous. Some courts have construed it as a
behavioral standard that focuses only on the defendant’s capacity to act rationally, i.e., to
behave appropriately in the courtroom or in interactions with defense counsel.151 Others
have construed it as a cognitive standard, equating it with Dusky’s “rational understanding”
149

Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 9, 24-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847). See supra notes 4850 and accompanying text.
150

The White House, History & Tours, Past Presidents, James K. Polk, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/jp11.html (last visited March 3, 2004).
151

A recent example is the case heard in the San Diego County Superior Court in
which the judge limited the forensic expert’s testimony on the issue of the defendant’s
ability to assist counsel. The judge ruled that the issue is determined solely by the
defendant’s ability to act rationally, not by the defendant’s ability to think rationally. See
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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test.152
As a behavioral standard, the “rational manner” standard fails as an appropriate
measure of defendant’s competence. Although the dignity of the court proceedings are not
disrupted by a defendant who sits quietly through the trial, the adversarial process
necessarily assumes that the defendant will be a rational and active participant in that
process. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that during the course of the
criminal trial, the defendant “may be required to make important decisions”153 and “strategic
choices.”154 The objective of providing the defendant with a fair trial cannot be achieved
unless the defendant has the requisite rational understanding of the proceedings. As the
Supreme Court noted in Drope v. Missouri, “It has long been accepted that a person whose
mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of
the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense
may not be subjected to a trial.”155
As a cognitive standard, the “rational manner” standard is both confusing and
unnecessary. Dusky’s “rational understanding” standard, which by its language focuses
attention on the defendant’s thinking, is a preferable alternative.

152

See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.

153

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993).

154

Id.

155

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
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In Godinez, the Supreme Court, in ruling that the Dusky standard is the minimum
due process requirement for competency, specifically noted that states may adopt, but are
not required to adopt, a competency standard that imposes additional requirements.156
Therefore, although Dusky is not the only possible standard that may be used to measure
competency, states are not free to adopt a standard that requires a lower level of
competence than is required by Dusky’s “rational understanding” standard.157 A “rational
manner” standard might be acceptable if it required the defendant to both rationally
understand and rationally act, but it would not be acceptable if it merely required the
defendant to act rationally without also requiring that the defendant have a rational
understanding. By this analysis, the San Diego County Superior Court judge erred in
applying the “rational manner” standard when he refused to consider the quality of the
defendant’s thinking, i.e., whether the defendant could consult with counsel with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding. If the quality of the defendant’s thinking is not
considered, the competency standard applied is lower than Dusky’s minimally required
“rational understanding” standard.
Stated theoretically, the “rational manner” standard could be construed to require a
higher level of competence than the “rational understanding” standard. Nevertheless, courts
in “rational manner” jurisdictions have not availed themselves of the opportunity to so

156

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402.

157

See id. (noting that states may “adopt competency standards that are more
elaborate than the Dusky formulation”).
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construe it, and, given the almost universal acceptance of the Dusky standard, they are not
likely to do so in the future. Unless they do so, however, the “rational manner” standard
exists only to confuse, not to clarify, the competency question.
Recommendation 2. Legislatures and appellate courts should refine the Dusky
“rational understanding” standard. Although the Dusky standard is preferable to the
“rational manner” standard, it too, is woefully deficient. Commentators have described the
Dusky standard as “unsatisfactorily vague,”158 “confusing and ambiguous,”159 “sketchy,”160
and lacking in specificity and detail.161 One judge acknowledged the Dusky’s “rational
understanding” language “eludes any attempt at uniform definition.”162 What is meant by a

158

Bennett, supra note 80, at 377.

159

Mark C. Bardwell & Bruce A. Arrigo, Competency to Stand Trial: A Law,
Psychology, and Policy Assessment, 30 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 147, 164 (2002). See also
Bonnie, supra note 15, at 593 (asserting that courts are confused by the question of how
the Dusky formula applies to impairments of a defendant’s abilities to make rational
decisions); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 653 (1993) (mentioning the “ambiguities of the
Supreme Court’s test”); Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and Considerations
Regarding the Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand
Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 351, 352 (2003) (asserting that the definition of competency to
stand trial, “as exemplified by the ambiguities of Dusky, has never been explicit”).
160

MELTON ET AL ., supra note 10, at 125. Melton also described Dusky as a “rather
sparsely worded standard.” Id. at 122. See also Steven L. Golding et al., Assessment and
Conceptualization of Competency to Stand Trial, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 323
(1984) (asserting “the abstract and open-ended characteristic of the Dusky standard allows .
. . for a good deal of confusion and ambiguity”).
161

Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 159, at 165. Bardwell and Arrigo also
characterized the Dusky standard as “ambiguous and underspecified.” Id. at 214.
162

Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1558 (10th Cir. 1991) (Brorby, J., dissenting).
-59-

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art19

60

Morris et al.:

“sufficient present ability”163 to consult with one’s lawyer? What is meant by “a reasonable
degree of rational understanding?”164 But rather than promoting legislative and judicial
efforts to clarify the competency standard by answering those questions, the Dusky
standard, by its very existence as the Supreme Court’s articulated standard, has obstructed
and prevented such efforts. Appellate courts in particular seem unwilling to risk reversal by
suggesting language that would give real meaning to Dusky’s largely-undefined competency
construct. Rather, courts take the safe route and merely quote the Dusky standard as being
the standard applicable to the case before it. As Jan Brakel recently noted, remarkably little
consideration has been given to the concept of rationality as a standard to separate those
who are fit to stand trial from those who are not.165
It is time to de-deify Dusky. Although both Florida and Utah have adopted the
Dusky standard by statute,166 at least they have also enacted legislation that provides some
further guidance to mental health professionals on what issues are to be considered and
addressed in the competency evaluation. 167 Other states have not chosen to provide such
guidance. The Florida and Utah statutes, however, are no panacea. Those statutes use words

163

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).

164

Id.

165

S. Jan Brakel, Competency to Stand Trial: Rationalism, “Contextualism” and
Other Modest Theories, 21 BEHAV. SCI . & L. 285, 286 (2003).
166

FLA. STAT . ANN. § 916.12(1) (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-2 (2003).

167

FLA. STAT . ANN. § 916.12(3) (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(4)

(2003).
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such as “comprehend,”168 “appreciate,”169 “understand,”170 and “engage in reasoned choice”171
without further clarification or definition. Perhaps this lack of specificity explains, at least
in part, a conclusion reached by researchers who conducted a study of Utah forensic
evaluators.172 The researchers found that despite the statutory requirement that evaluators
consider and address the defendant’s capacity to “engage in reasoned choice of legal
strategies and options,”173 such consideration occurred “relatively infrequently.”174
By and large, the legal profession has left it to mental health professionals to
develop their own competence assessment instruments to operationalize the Dusky
standard. But those instruments are not without their limitations. Until recently, such
instruments did not provide for standardized administration and objective, criterion-based
scoring.175 The recently developed MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool–Criminal

168

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(4)(a)(i), (iii) (2003).

169

FLA. STAT . ANN. § 916.12(3)(a), (b) (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-155(4)(a)(i), (iii) (2003).
170

FLA. STAT . ANN. § 916.12(3)(c) (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-155(4)(a)(v) (2003).
171

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(4)(a)(iv) (2003).

172

See generally Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Logic and Reliability of Evaluations of
Competence to Stand Trial, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519, 522-45 (1998) (reporting on
the study of Utah forensic evaluators).
173

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(4)(a)(iv) (2003).

174

Skeem et al., supra note 172, at 532.

175

MELTON ET AL ., supra note 10, at 148.
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Adjudication [MacCAT-CA] broadly assesses both the defendant’s cognitive and decision
making capabilities and is a standardized and nationally norm-referenced clinical
measure.176 However, the MacCAT-CA has been criticized for its primary reliance on a
hypothetical vignette format which limits the evaluator’s ability to assess the defendant’s
competence to deal with the specific issues involved in defending his or her particular
case.177 By eliminating items and measures from its more comprehensive prototype178
(which took two hours to administer),179 the streamlined MacCAT-CA (which only takes
thirty-five to forty minutes to administer)180 compromised the ability of evaluators to
assess a key component of competence–the defendant’s ability to make decisions that arise

176

Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 159, at 359. Thomas Grisso declared: “The degree of
standardization of administration provided by the MacCAT-CA, as well as evidence for
interscorer reliability, inspires confidence in the norms and their application in clinical
cases.” THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES : FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 97 (2d ed. 2003). See generally MELTON ET AL ., supra note 10, at 145-48
(discussing the MacCAT-CA); Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 159, at 191-99 (discussing
the MacCAT-CA).
177

Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 159, at 360-61.

178

See Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study:
Development and Validation of a Research Instrument, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141,
147-77 (1997) (discussing the MacCAT-CA prototype).
179

Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 159, at 196. The two hours required for
administration of the prototype was characterized by researchers as “daunting” in light of
other available measures that were administered in thirty to forty-five minutes. Hoge et al.,
supra note 178, at 176.
180

Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 159, at 196.
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in the criminal process.181
Some writers have suggested that contemporary assessment tools and continued
efforts to improve them will fail due to the inherent problems in the legal definition of
competency. 182 Until the courts and legislatures clarify the language of Dusky, competence
assessment instruments are merely attempts to quantify the unquantifiable.183 Even if these
instruments can be improved in the future, they are of no value unless they are used.
181

Id. at 198-99. See Bonnie, supra note 15, at 567-87 (proposing that decisional
competence should be distinguished conceptually and doctrinally from competence to
assist counsel).
182

Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 159, at 151 (asserting that “problems inherent in
the legal definitions and difficulties with past instruments suggest that contemporary
measures will, by logical extension, be similarly suspect”), 180 (asserting that “assessment
difficulties are traceable to the legal standard as set forth in Dusky and its progeny”), 199
(asserting that “advances in the clinical evaluation area are constrained by legal cases
[specifically mentioning Dusky]; thus the psychological measures are limited in what they
can achieve”), 201 (asserting that “although clinical and scholarly efforts continue to
revamp assessment measures, problems inherent in the controlling and enduring standards
[specifically mentioning Dusky] logically suggest that the instruments themselves will also
be similarly flawed”).
183

See Bennett, supra note 80, at 379. Bennett asserts that psychological tests are
helpful in delineating areas of inquiry for the evaluator but that the final determination of
competence depends on the interrelationship of many factors, some of which are not
related to the evaluator’s clinical findings. Id. See also JOHN W. PARRY, NATIONAL
BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 169 (Mara
L. Flynn ed., American Bar Association 1998) (asserting that testimony based solely on
psychological assessment instruments “is an inadequate foundation for clinical opinion
about criminal competence. None of these competency instruments assess legal
competency per se, but rather provide an index of abilities that are relevant to making legal
determinations about a defendant’s competence.”); Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 77
(asserting that the question of whether the defendant is competent “is a highly
contextualized value judgment that depends on the circumstances of the particular case,”
thus because not all competence-related abilities are amenable to standardized assessment,
no quantifiable test can decide whether the defendant is competent).
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Research indicates that, at least currently, the overwhelming majority of psychiatrists and
psychologists do not use psychological tests in assessing a defendant’s competency. 184
Rather, they rely primarily on their own forensic interview with the defendant.
B. The Competency Adjudication Process: The Roles of Judges, Lawyers, and
Forensic Evaluators
Recommendation 3. Judges, lawyers, and forensic evaluators should understand
and accept their roles in the competency assessment process. Improving the standard
used to measure the defendant’s competency will not, in and of itself, assure that the
process for determining competency is improved. Problems in the process itself need to
be addressed. For example, trial court judges should not be allowed to relinquish their
responsibility for deciding the issue of the defendant’s competency to stand trial to
psychiatrists and psychologists.185 It is simply unacceptable for judges to assert that mental
health professionals are better trained and better qualified to answer the question of

184

Randy Borum & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Test Use in Criminal Forensic
Evaluations, 26 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOL.: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 465, 468 (1995)
(reporting that only 11% of psychiatrists and 36% of psychologists studied almost always
used forensic assessment instruments in assessing competence to stand trial); Skeem et al.,
supra note 172, at 537 (reporting that only 25% of forensic reports studied described
using forensic assessment instruments in assessing competence to stand trial). See also
Miller, supra note 11, at 385 (asserting that “most of the experience in using [forensic
assessment instruments] resides in inpatient clinicians,” not community clinicians).
Miller’s comment suggests that psychological tests are more frequently used to assess
whether an incompetent defendant has been “restored” to competency, rather than whether
he or she was incompetent initially.
185

See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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competency than they are. Psychiatrists and psychologists are experts in assessing whether
the defendant has a diagnosable mental disorder or whether the defendant is malingering.186
They can explain how a person’s mental disorder affects, or may affect, his or her
understanding of issues and decision making capability. But they are not expert in deciding
whether the defendant has a “sufficient” ability to consult with his or her attorney or has a
“reasonable” degree of rational understanding. Those decisions are legal policy decisions
appropriately within the province of the judge.187
Attorneys, especially defense attorneys, have an important role to play in the
competency evaluation process. It is simply unacceptable for them to claim that they lack
the time and inclination to provide information to the forensic evaluator about their
interaction with their client and the defense strategy in the case that may be helpful in
assessing the defendant’s capacity to consult with counsel. After all, the defense attorney

186

See Perlin, supra note 159, at 679 (asserting that in deciding the issue of
competency to stand trial, courts focus, “almost obsessively, on testimony that raises the
specter of malingering” despite the absence of evidence suggesting that malingering is a
significant problem).
187

Ironically, in the Dusky case itself, the decision of the trial judge, who did not
blindly accept the testifying psychiatrist’s conclusion that Dusky was incompetent, was
reversed by the Supreme Court. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (per curiam).
The Supreme Court expressed concern that the trial judge had merely determined that
Dusky was oriented to time, place, and person, even though the trial judge expressly stated
that he also considered whether the defendant understood the charges against him, was able
to recite facts about the case with his attorney, and was able to assist in his own defense.
See id. In his memorandum to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General asserted that
before the trial judge rejects the conclusion of the forensic expert, the “judge ought at a
minimum, have other expert opinion.” Memorandum for the United States, supra note 73,
at 12.
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is the individual who knows best whether the defendant’s impairments impede or
compromise the defense of the case.188 Admittedly, the law only requires a “global”
assessment of the defendant’s competence to stand trial, i.e., it asks only for an analysis of
the defendant’s ability to consult with his or her attorney, not an analysis of the actual
consultation between them.189 Nevertheless, information on the actual interaction between
the defense attorney and the defendant and probable defense strategy may be important, if
not critical, to the evaluator’s assessment. Such information is especially significant in
cases in which the defense attorney has raised the issue of the defendant’s competency. In
its Criminal Justice Standards, the American Bar Association has included a standard that
authorizes defense attorneys to attend forensic evaluations of their clients’ competence to
stand trial.190 The commentary to that standard notes: “A thorough evaluation may require
that counsel be present at the interview to enable the evaluating professional to observe the
attorney-client relationship. Counsel’s attendance may also ensure that the clinician will
receive needed information about the defense strategy in the case . . . .”191
Even if the attorney does not attend the evaluation, the attorney and the evaluator

188

Bonnie, supra note 15, at 546, 563.

189

The Dusky standard, for example, asks only whether the defendant “has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.” Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
190

ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-3.6(c)(i)
(1989). The standard provides that “the defense attorney is entitled to be present at the
evaluation.” Id.
191

Id. Commentary at 104.
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should engage in a meaningful dialogue before the evaluation is performed. To adequately
protect the defendant’s legitimate interest in maintaining confidentiality regarding defense
strategy and the privilege against self-incrimination, courts can place constraints on the
contents of the forensic report or redact portions of the report before it is disclosed to the
prosecution and can limit the testimony of the forensic evaluator when the competency
issue is considered in court.192
If, as the American Bar Association asserts, defense counsel “may well be the single
most important witness” on the issue of the defendant’s ability to consult and interact
appropriately with his or her attorney, 193 then defense attorneys should be encouraged to
testify on this issue in court.194 It is simply unacceptable for the defense attorney to raise
the issue of his or her client’s competency to stand trial, listen to the trial judge challenge
the forensic evaluator’s testimony that the defendant is incompetent, register objection to
the court’s ruling that the defendant is competent, and then state to the judge, “I, as his
attorney, have reached [the conclusion that the defendant is not properly able to assist in his
defense], although I do not feel, as his attorney, that I should take the witness stand and be

192

Similarly, if the evaluation is recorded, the court may enter a protective order
redacting portions of the recording before it is forwarded to the prosecution. Id. Standard
7-3.6(d).
193

Id. Standard 7-4.8 Commentary at 211. See also Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 450 (1992), in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that defense counsel “will
often have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense.”
194

See supra notes 24-27 (discussing defense attorney reluctance to testify in
competency hearings).
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sworn and offer evidence in that regard.”195 But that is exactly what happened at the
competency hearing of Milton Dusky!196
To encourage defense attorneys to testify on the competency issue, the American
Bar Association has adopted a standard that would protect the testifying attorney from a
requirement that he or she divulge confidential communications or communications
protected by the attorney-client privilege.197 If the defense attorney’s testimony irreparably
damages the attorney-client relationship, another defense attorney should be substituted for
the testifying attorney. That alternative is clearly preferable to conducting a criminal trial
of a truly incompetent defendant who was found competent because the defendant’s first
attorney chose not to testify. Substitution of counsel for a legitimate reason is
permissible; trial of an incompetent defendant is not.
Finally, psychiatrists and psychologists who perform competency to stand trial
evaluations must learn to differentiate clinical issues from forensic issues. Numerous
comments from respondents in the study we conducted clearly suggested that decisions on
competence were determined by clinical considerations–did the defendant have a serious
mental illness,198 was the defendant psychotic,199 would the defendant benefit from

195

MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 118.

196

Id.

197

ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-4.8(b)(ii).

198

See supra Part IIIC2b.

199

Id.
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treatment200–and not by the legal standard for competency that was supposedly applicable to
the assessment. It is simply unacceptable for an evaluator to assert, as did one respondent
did in answering Vignette 1 of our survey, “Irrespective of the specific legal definition of
competency, in this case the defendant is incompetent based on active psychosis that
impairs his reasoning ability and judgment.”201
Although we do not condone this response, we may be able to explain it. If courts
and legislatures are unwilling to develop and refine a better standard for measuring
competency than the vague Dusky standard,202 the evaluator cannot be expected to divine a
more definitive standard. If trial judges express interest only in the evaluator’s ultimate
conclusion so that they may adopt that conclusion as their own,203 the evaluator is
encouraged to testify only about his or her ultimate conclusion, not the information and the
analysis of that information that serves as the basis for the evaluator’s judgment.204 If

200

See supra Part IIIC2c.

201

More than thirty years ago, the American Bar Foundation asserted that most
doctors approach the issue of competency to stand trial by asking themselves: “Is this
patient psychotic?” The American Bar Foundation responded: “This is not the appropriate
question.” MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 86.
202

See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.

203

See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.

204

See, e.g., Skeem et al., supra note 172, at 533, noting that evaluators’ reports
“generally provide little data to support their conclusions about defendant’s [competency to
stand trial] impairments.” When impairments were noted, evaluators “typically provided no
description of a relationship between the impairment and symptoms of psychopathology . . .
or merely asserted that there was a relationship. Very few reports provided data or
reasoning to specifically describe how a defendant’s psychopathology compromised
-69-

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art19

70

Morris et al.:

defense attorneys do not provide evaluators with information about their interactions with
their clients,205 evaluators are unable to analyze that interaction in assessing the defendant’s
ability to consult with his or her attorney.206 Unless judges, lawyers, and forensic
evaluators understand and accept their roles in the competency assessment process, the
elusive goal of that process–to assure that the defendant receives a fair trial–will not be
achieved.

[competency to stand trial] abilities.” Id. (emphasis in original).
205

See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.

206

In order to perform a competent evaluation, the forensic psychiatrist or
psychologist should contact the defense attorney to discuss the case or to arrange a
meeting if the attorney has not taken the initiative to contact the forensic evaluator.
Generally, forensic evaluators do not initiate such contact. See Skeem et al., supra note
172, at 537 (reporting that only 9% of the forensic reports studied indicated that the
evaluator contacted the defense attorney).
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